Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

J. Marius Nielson and Faye K. Nielson v.
Prowswood Ltd. dba Prowswood Realtor & Rita
Luke : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Olsen; Gary R. Henrie; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hansen; Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondents.
Rita Luke; Dennis K. Poole; J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Poole & Smith; Attorneys for Defendant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nielson v. Prowswood & Luke, No. 880709 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1478

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
K FU
DOCKET NO. - Z i r

L
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J. MARIUS NIELSON and
FAYE K. NIELSON,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PROWSWOOD, LTD.

vs.
PROWSWOOD, LTD., a Utah
corporation dba PROWSWOOD
REALTOR,

wncn-cfi

Defendant and Appellant;
and
RITA LUKE, individually and
as an agent for
PROWSWOOD REALTOR,

Docket No. 880431

Defendant and Respondent

#Hto

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

DAVID R. OLSEN [2458]
DENNIS K. POOLE
[2625]
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
[3340]
GARY R. HENRIE [5083]
POOLE & SMITH
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG
Attorneys For Defendant-Appellant
& HANSEN
Prowswood, Ltd.
Attorneys for Plaintiff4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Respondents Nielsons
Salt Lake City, Utah
84117
700 Clark Learning Office
Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
RITA LUKE
Defendant-Respondent Pro Se
4092 South 670 East #G

Salt Lake City, Utah

84107

DENNIS K. POOLE
[2625]
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
[3340]
POOLE & SMITH
Attorneys For Defendant
and Appellant Prowswood, Ltd.
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah
84117
Telephone (801) 263-334

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J. MARIUS NIELSON and
FAYE K. NIELSON,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PROWSWOOD, LTD.

vs.
PROWSWOOD, LTD., a Utah
corporation dba PROWSWOOD
REALTOR,
Defendant and Appellant;
and

Docket No. 880431
RITA LUKE, individually and
as an agent for
PROWSWOOD REALTOR,
Defendant and Respondent
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

TABLE OF CONTENTS
NO.
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature and Disposition
Relevant Facts
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.
Written Authority
2.
Apparent Authority
3.
Ratification
4.
Admission of Evidence
5.
Rental Offset
6.
Judgment Against Luke

3
3
3
7
7
8
8
9
9
9

ARGUMENT
1.

9

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Without Written Authority, Luke Was As A Matter Of
Law Unable To Bind Prowswood To Purchase The
Property
Luke Lacked Apparent Authority To Bind Prowswood .
Prowswood Did Not Ratify The Agreement With The
Nielsons By Accepting A Real Estate Commission
From The Koches
A.
Prowswood Lacked Both Knowledge and Intent to
Ratify
B.
Any Ratification Had to Be in Writing . . . .
C.
Prowswood Did Not Ratify the Luke Agreement
By Accepting a Commission Under the Listing
Agreement
Evidence of Marius Nielson's Experience As A
Licensed Real Estate Broker Should Have Been
Admitted
The Reasonable Rental Value of The Property Should
Offset The Nielsons1 Judgment
If the Nielsons1 Judgment Against Prowswood Is
Affirmed, Prowswood Is Entitled To A Judgment Over
Against Luke

CONCLUSION

9
11
14
14
16
17
18
20
21
24

ADDENDUM
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE NO.
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1 (1953)

2,1,9

Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-3 (1953)

3, 7, 10

Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-4 (1953)

10, 11

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953)

1

CASES
Associated Creditors' Agency v. Davis. 530 P.2d 1084, 1100
(Cal. 1975)

18

Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982)

10, 14

Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)

10

City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth. 672 P.2d 89
(Utah 1983)

11

Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980)

21

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Insurance Agency,
96 Idaho 691, 535 P. 2d 664 (Idaho 1975)

22

Larson v. Bear. 230 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1951)

12

Malia v. Giles. 114 P.2d 208 (Utah 1941)

12

State v. GAF Corp. . 760 P. 2d 310 (Utah 1988)
Stuart v. National Indemnity Co.. 7 Ohio App.3d 63, 454
N.E.2d 158, 165 (Ct.App. Ohio 1982)

13
24

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 27

12

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 98

17

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 399 et seq

23

•

t

11

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 399(a)

22

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 401, Comment d

22

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 416

23

Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

•• •

in

3, 19

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953).
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Utah Supreme Court by notice of the Clerk of the Utah Supreme
Court dated December 22, 1988.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs
J. Marius Nielson and Faye K. Nielson ("the Nielsons") and
against

Defendants

Prowswood,

Ltd. dba Prowswood

Realtor

("Prowswood") and Rita Luke ("Luke") entered after a bench
trial before District Judge David S. Young.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
At issue on this appeal is an agreement to purchase real
property which Luke, a real estate agent, signed, purportedly
on behalf of Prowswood, her broker*

The Nielsons later

attempted to enforce the agreement against Prowswood.

The

following issues are presented:
1.

Without written authority, could Luke legally bind

Prowswood to purchase real property?
2.

Where

the Nielsons

had

no

communications

with

Prowswood regarding Luke's authority, but relied exclusively

1

on

Luke's

own

representations,

did

Luke

have

apparent

authority to bind Prowswood?
3.

Where Prowswood lacked both knowledge of the pur-

chase agreement and an intent to ratify it, did Prowswood's
acceptance of a commission under the Koch listing agreement
ratify the Luke purchase agreement?
4.
licensed

Was evidence of Maurius Nielson's experience as a
real

estate

broker

relevant

and

therefore

admissible?
5.

Should the reasonable rental value of the property

during the period

of the Nielsons' occupancy

offset the

Nielsons' damage award?
6.
-affirmed,

If the Nielsons' Judgment
is Prowswood

entitled

against

Prowswood

is

to judgment over against

Luke?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Interpretation of the following statutes and rules is
determinative of the first and fourth issues stated above:
Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1 (1953):
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall
be created . . . otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating . . . the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.

2

Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-3 (1953):
Every contract for • . . the sale, of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party by whom the . • .
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
RULE 402, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state of
Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature and Disposition.

This is an action brought by

the Nielsons seeking specific performance of an agreement to
purchase a condominium entered into by Luke, a real estate
agent, purportedly on behalf of Prowswood, her broker.

The

matter was tried before District Judge David S. Young, who
granted judgment in favor of the Nielsons against Prowswood
and Luke jointly and severally.
Relevant Facts.

The following facts of the case are

relevant to the issues on review:
1.
estate

At all material times, Luke was a licensed real
agent

"Agreement

of

of

Prowswood

Independent

Contractor Agreement").
Exhibit 15-D(a).

under

a

Contractor"

contract
("the

entitled

Independent

Trial Transcript, Vol 1, p. 156;

2.

Paragraph 9 of the Independent Contractor Agreement

expressly withheld from Luke the authority "to incur any expense, enter any contract, or make any representation or
commitment

for and on behalf of

[Prowswood] unless such

authority is specifically given, in writing, with respect to
each such transaction."
3.

Prowswood

Exhibit 15-D(a).

never

authorized

Luke

in

writing

otherwise to purchase real property on its behalf.

or

Trial

Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 206.
4.

The Nielsons were looking for a home to lease in

Salt Lake City; Luke showed the Nielsons a condominium owned
by

Mr.

and

property").
5.

Mrs.

Koch

and

listed

with

Prowswood

("the

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 14-16.

On

or

about

November

19,

1985,

the

Nielsons

executed an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase the
property.

On that same date, Luke, purportedly on behalf of

Prowswood, executed an agreement with the Nielsons stating
that if the Nielsons elected not to retain possession of the
property prior to June 1, 1986, Prowswood would have 120 days
to sell or "repurchase" the property at a price that would
net the Nielsons $160,000, the full purchase price paid by
them ("Luke Agreement" or "the Agreement").
2-P.

4

Exhibits 1-P and

6.

Prowswood granted Luke no authority, written or

oral, to bind Prowswood to purchase the property.

Trial

Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 206.
7.

Luke

knew

that

she

lacked

Prowswood to purchase the property.

authority

to

bind

Trial Transcript, Vol.

2.9 P- 206.
8.

Prowswood has never had a guaranteed sales program

with respect to properties not owned by Prowswood.

Trial

Transcript. Vol. 2. p. 15.
9.

Although

Maurius

Nielson

was

concerned

as

to

whether Luke had authority to bind Prowswood, he made no
inquiry of anyone at Prowswood, including his own son-in-law,
as to whether she had such authority. Trial Transcript, Vol.
-1, pp. 105-06.
10.
they

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Nielson ever testified that

relied

upon

any

act

or

omission

of

Prowswood, or

anything other than Luke's own representations, in determining whether she was authorized to bind Prowswood to the Luke
Agreement.
11.
had

no

Trial Transcript. Vols. 1 & 2.

Prior to the date of the Luke Agreement, Prowswood
communication with

authority or its limits.

the Nielsons

regarding

Luke's

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 52-

53; 144.
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12.

Marius Nielsen is a licensed real estate broker in

California and since 1962 has been a licensed real estate
broker in Utah.
13.

Exhibit 12-D(a).

Maurius

Nielson

was

previously

employed

by

a

Prowswood subsidiary, Transwest Building Supply, as a vice
president

in

charge

of

day-to-day

operations;

in

that

capacity, he had no authority to purchase real property.
Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 142-43.
14.

Expert witness Wilburn McDougal

testified that,

although he was familiar with guaranteed sales programs, a
guaranteed buy-back at 100% of the purchase price would be
unusual.
15.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1. pp. 132-33.
Mr. McDougal further testified that, with respect

bo his own company's guaranteed sales program, while some
agents were at times authorized to sign a buy-back agreement,
such authorizations were made on an individual basis.

Trial

Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 132.
16.

Upon the sale of the property to the Nielsons,

Prowswood and Luke received sales commissions paid by the
sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Koch.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p.

197; Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 12, 16.
17.

Prowswood was unaware of the Luke Agreement at the

time it accepted a commission from Mr. and Mrs. Koch on the
sale of the property.

6

Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 12.

18.

By letter dated May 10, 1986, the Nielsons demanded

that Prowswood either resell or purchase the property within
12 0 days pursuant to the Luke Agreement.
expired on September 10. 1986.
19.

The 12 0 days

Exhibit 3-P.

By letter dated June 10, 1986, Prowswood notified

the Nielsons that binding Prowswood to purchase the property
"was far in excess" of Luke's authority as a sales agent.
Exhibit 4-P.
20.

Also in that letter, Prowswood offered to list the

property for sale and to waive its commission on the sale.
Exhibit 4-P.
21.

The Nielsons occupied the property through trial.

Trial Transcript. Vol. 1. p. 16.
22.

Gene C. Jorgensen further testified that the fair

market rental value of the property was between $900.00 and
$1,000.00 per month for each month during the period 1986
through the date of trial.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 2. p. 33.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prowswood1s

arguments

may

be

summarized

briefly

as

follows:
1.

Written Authority.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Sections 25-5-1, -3, and -4 (1953), a contract to purchase
real property is void unless the agent signing on behalf of a
principal had written authority.

Since Prowswood did not

authorize Luke in writing to enter into an agreement to
purchase real property, Prowswood is not bound by the Luke
Agreement•
2.

Apparent

Authority.

For apparent

authority

to

exist, the principal must cause the third party to reasonably
believe

that

the

agent

is clothed with

authority.

The

Nielsons did not infer Luke's authority from the acts or
conduct of Prowswood; in fact, they received no communications from Prowswood relating to Luke's authority.
relied

exclusively

authority.

on Luke's

own representations

They
of her

Therefore, Luke lacked apparent authority and

Prowswood is not bound by the Luke Agreement.
3.

Ratification.

a. To ratify an act, a principal

-must have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to
ratify.

Since Prowswood lacked both, it could not ratify the

Luke Agreement.
b. Where, as here, the original grant of authority must
be in writing, its ratification must also be in writing.
Since Prowswood's purported ratification was not written, it
is void.

c.

A principal's acceptance of a benefit consti-

tutes an affirmance only where he has no claim to the benefit
except through the act purportedly affirmed.

Since Prowswood

was entitled to its commission exclusively through the Koch
listing agreement, accepting and retaining the commission did
not ratify the Luke Agreement.
8

4.
Nielson

Admission
is

a

of

himself

Evidence,

The

fact

a

real

estate

licensed

that

Marius

broker is

relevant to his knowledge of the authority of real estate
agents and therefore increased his burden to ascertain Luke's
authority.
5.

It should have been admitted.

Rental Offset.

The parties agreed that Prowswood

was entitled to an offset for the fair rental value of the
property for the 22 months between the alleged breach and
trial.

Fair rental value is between $900.00 and $lf000.00

per month.
6.

It should have been awarded.

Judgment Against Luke.

Prowswood

is entitled to

judgment over against Luke for damages it suffered as a
result of her clear breach of the Independent Contractor
Agreement.

ARGUMENT
1.
WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORITY, LUKE WAS AS A MATTER OF LAW
UNABLE TO BIND PROWSWOOD TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY
It is undisputed that Luke did not have written authority to enter into an agreement to purchase property on behalf
of Prowswood.

Yet without written authority, an agent cannot

bind her principal to purchase real property.

Utah Code Ann.

Section 25-5-1 (1953) states in pertinent part:

9

No estate or interest in real property . . . shall
be created • • . otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating • . . the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.
The Utah Supreme Court applied this provision in Cady v.
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), where it stated:
Utah law is clear that only a written power of
attorney will authorize one to bind another to a
contract for the sale of real property.
[Quotation of Section 25-5-1]
In the instant case, there was no dispute as to the
absence of the written power of attorney. Therefore, no authorization was ever established. There
being no authorization, there could be no contract;
there being no contract, there could be no right to
recover . . .
Accord,

Utah

Code

Ann.

Sec.

25-5-3

(1953);

Bradshaw v.

McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Utah 1982) ("an agent executing
an agreement conveying an interest in land on behalf of his
principal must be authorized in writing.")

See also, Utah

Code Ann. Section 25-5-4 (1953).
For this Court to affirm the enforcement of an agreement
to purchase real property against a principal without written
authority would wreak havoc in the real estate industry in
this state.

It would effectively repeal the cornerstone of

real estate law and open a Pandora's Box of uncertainty and
litigation.
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2.
LUKE LACKED APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND PROWSWOOD
The trial court found as a matter of fact and a matter
of law that "Rita Luke had the apparent authority to bind
Prowswood and execute the Agreement."
Conclusions of Law, p. 12.

Findings of Fact and

The trial court entered no other

findings or conclusions concerning Luke's authority to bind
Prowswood.

It found no actual, express, inherent, or implied

authority.
As pointed out above, the authority to enter into an
agreement

to purchase real property

can never be merely

apparent, since it must be evidenced by a writing.

But even

if that were not the case, the trial court's conclusion of
-law that Luke had apparent authority misreads the law of
apparent authority.
City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d
89 (Utah 1983) is the leading Utah case on the subject of
apparent

authority.

Chrysler-Plymouth

There,

instructed

an
a

officer

car

of

salesman

Dean
to

Evans

make

a

purchase from City Electric and have it billed to Dean Evans.
The salesman placed the order, informed City Electric that he
was acting on the officer's directions, and instructed City
Electric to charge Dean Evans' account.

The issue treated on

appeal was whether the salesman was clothed with apparent

authority.

The Utah Supreme Court held that he was not.

The

Court stated:
It is well settled law that the apparent or
ostensible authority of an agent can be inferred
only from the acts and conduct of the principal.
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of Pres. of Ch. .
etc. , Utah, 534 P.2d 887 (1975). . . .

It follows

that one who deals exclusively with an agent has
the responsibility to ascertain that agent's
authority despite the agent's representations.
Bradshaw v. McBride, Utah 649 P.2d 74 (1982).
Id. at 90.
(1957).

Accord, Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 27

See also. Malia v. Giles. 114 P.2d 208 (Utah 1941);

Larson v. Bear. 230 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1951).
In the instant case, Mr. Nielson testified that he asked
Luke if she had authority to sign the Agreement and that she
assured them that she did.
-solely
Neither

on

the

Mr.

strength

nor

Mrs.

The Nielsons signed the Agreement
of this

Nielson

representation

ever

testified

of Luke.
that

they

inferred her authority from the acts or conduct of Prowswood.
In fact, Mr. Nielson testified emphatically and repeatedly
that

despite his

concern about whether or not Luke had

authority to bind Prowswood to the Agreement, he did not
inquire of anyone at Prowswood, including his own son-in-law,
as to Luke's authority to execute the Agreement.

Trial

Transcript. Vol. 1. pp. 105-07.
The fact that Prowswood
cards and letterhead

provided Luke with business

is wholly irrelevant to this issue.

First of all, there was no testimony that a real estate
12

agent's letterhead or business card creates any implication
that

the

agent

has

purchase a property.

authority

to

bind

the brokerage to

Second, there was no testimony that the

Nielsons ever saw either her letterhead or her business card.
Third, the Nielsons never testified that they relied on her
letterhead or business card in concluding she had authority
to bind Prowswood.
Furthermore, as a matter of law, promotional materials
without more do not create apparent authority.

The Utah

Supreme Court so ruled in State v. GAF Corp. , 760 P.2d 310
(Utah

1988).

There,

the

State

Department

of

Consumer

Protection sought to enforce against GAF a warranty made by
one of its retailers, relying upon promotional materials
^supplied by GAF to retailers as a basis for finding apparent
authority.

After quoting the passage from City Electric

excerpted above, the Court held that:
Merely providing promotional materials to Pendleton
[the retailer] is not sufficient to establish GAF's
liability for Pendleton's statements on a theory of
apparent authority.
760 P.2d at 314.
letterhead

and

For purposes of this analysis, Rita Luke's
business

cards

and

this

promotional materials are indistinguishable.
affiliation

with

a

principal;

neither

retailer's

GAF

Both suggest an

creates

apparent

authority.
In sum, the record here is devoid of any evidence that
the Nielsons inferred from Prowswood1s acts or conduct that

Luke was authorized to bind Prowswood.

For this Court to

affirm a finding of apparent authority on this state of the
record would throw the law of apparent authority into a state
of disarray.

3.
PROWSWOOD DID NOT RATIFY THE AGREEMENT WITH THE NIELSONS
BY ACCEPTING A REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FROM THE KOCHES
The trial court found as a matter of fact and a matter
of law that Prowswood ratified the Luke Agreement.
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 12.

Findings

This conclusion

rests, apparently, on the findings that Prowswood received a
sales commission (Finding No. 45) and that it "has retained
its commission and has not returned the commission to Rita
Luke."

Finding No. 46.

It is unclear what the court meant

by "returning" the commission to Rita Luke, since Prowswood
did not receive the commission from her.

The commission was

paid by the Koches, sellers of the property to the Nielsons.
For at least three reasons, Prowswood did not ratify
Luke's execution of the Agreement by accepting and retaining
a sales commission.

A.

Prowswood
Ratify

Lacked

Both

Knowledge

and

Intent

to

In Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court explained that to ratify an agent's acts,
14

a principal must have both knowledge of the material facts
and an intent to ratify:
A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an
agreement made by an unauthorized agent. Ratification of an agent's acts relates back to the time
the unauthorized act occurred and is sufficient to
create the relationship of principal and agent.
[Citations omitted.] . . . However, a ratification
requires the principal to have knowledge of all
material facts and an intent to ratify.
Id. at 78 (emphasis added).

Both knowledge and intent are

necessary.
Prowswood was unaware of the Luke Agreement when it
accepted the commission from Mr. and Mrs. Koch on the sale of
the property.

That is undisputed.

Since Prowswood lacked

"knowledge of all material facts," it could not have ratified
the Luke Agreement at that time.
But did Prowswood ratify the Agreement by retaining the
commission after learning the material facts?

Clearly not.

Prowswood learned of the of the existence of the Agreement
and the Nielsons1

reliance upon it through the Nielsons1

letter dated May 10, 1989.

By letter dated June 10, 1986,

Prowswood notified the Nielsons that the authority to bind
Prowswood to purchase the property "was far in excess" of
Luke's authority

as a sales agent.

repudiated the Agreement.

In other words, it

Clearly, it did not manifest an

intent to ratify.
Since Prowswood lacked both knowledge and intent, it did
not ratify the Luke Agreement at any time.

B.

Any Ratification Had to Be in Writing

Further in Bradshaw v. McBride, the Court held:
Where the law requires the authority to be given in
writing, the ratification must also generally be in
writing. [Citations omitted.]
649 P. 2d at 79.

As noted above, Utah law requires that an

agent executing an agreement to purchase real property must
be

authorized

in

writing.

Therefore,

the

principal's

ratification of the agent's acts must also be in writing.
The trial court found no such writing.

No such writing

exists.
Nor may

Prowswood's

retention

of the

commission be

deemed a part performance sufficient to take the case outside
±he

statute of frauds, since "the acts of part performance

must be exclusively referable to the contract." Id.

In this

case, retaining the commission was not "exclusively referable" to the Luke Agreement.

In fact, the Luke Agreement does

not even mention a commission; the commission is provided for
in the listing agreement between Prowswood and the Koches, as
discussed below.

16

C.

Prowswood Did Not Ratify the Luke Agreement By
Accepting a Commission Under the Listing Agreement

The Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 98, specifically addresses when receipt of a benefit may be construed as an
affirmance or ratification.

That section states in pertinent

part:
The receipt by a purported principal . . . of
something to which he would not be entitled unless
an act purported to be done for him were affirmed,
and to which he makes no claim except through such
act, constitutes an affirmance . . .
Prowswood's commission was not "something to which [it] would
not be entitled" absent affirmance, nor did Prowswood claim
its commission through the Luke Agreement.
entitled to

Prowswood was

its commission through a different agreement

altogether: the Koch listing agreement.

When it fulfilled

the conditions of the listing agreement, Prowswood became
legally entitled to receive a sales commission from Mr. and
Mrs. Koch, irrespective of the enforceability of the Luke
Agreement.

Therefore, acceptance of the commission cannot be

construed as ratification of the Luke Agreement.
Implicit in the trial court's finding that Prowswood did
not "return" its commission to Luke is the suggestion that
doing so would have had the effect of repudiating the Luke
Agreement.

That suggestion does not withstand analysis.

Since Prowswood did not claim the commission though the Luke
Agreement, returning the commission could not have had the
effect of repudiating the Luke Agreement.

Although Mr.

Nielson made much of the fact that he would not have purchased

the property without

the Luke Agreement, the two

agreements were legally independent.

4.
EVIDENCE OF MARIUS NIELSON!S EXPERIENCE AS A
LICENSED REAL ESTATE BROKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED
Marius Nielson holds brokerage
California.

licenses in Utah and

At times these licenses have been active, at

other times inactive.

He had two companies, one called J.

Marius Nielson Real Estate Company, another called J. Marius
Nielson Associates.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 139.

On cross-examination, Prowswood's counsel attempted to
-elicit from Mr. Nielson testimony regarding his experience as
a broker in these real estate companies, and specifically his
understanding of a real estate agent1s authority to bind his
or her broker.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 140.

Also

relevant to the action would have been Mr. Nielson1s experience, if any, with guaranteed buy-back programs.

However,

the trial court sustained an objection based on relevance,
thereby preventing counsel from exploring these issues with
Mr. Nielson.
The

Id.

testimony

sought

from

Mr.

Nielson

relevant to the issue of apparent authority.

was

clearly

In Associated

Creditors1 Agency v. Davis, 530 P.2d 1084, 1100 (Cal. 1975),
18

the California Supreme Court stated the requirements for a
finding of apparent authority as follows:
It is elementary that there are three requirements
necessary before recovery may be had against a
principal for the act of an ostensible agent. The
person dealing with he agent must do so with belief
in the agent's authority and this belief must be a
reasonable one; such belief must be generated by
some act or neglect of the principal sought to be
charged; and the third person reiving on the
agent's apparent authority must not be guilty of
negligence. [Emphasis added, citations omitted.]
Mr.

Nielson

testified

that

he

relied

upon

Rita

Luke's

assurances that she had authority to execute the Agreement
for Prowswood.

In accepting her representations without

further independent investigation, Mr. Nielson acted negligently.

Mr. Nielson's knowledge and experience with real

estate agents and their authority heightened his duty to
inquire of Prowswood as to Luke's authority and were therefore relevant to his negligence.
Similarly, if his testimony had shown that he did not
offer guaranteed buy-back programs or that he was largely
unfamiliar with them, those facts would have indicated an
even greater degree of negligence on his part in relying upon
Luke's representations.
His testimony would therefore have been relevant.

Rule

402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence establishes the admissibility

of

considerations:

relevant

evidence

absent

countervailing

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state of
Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state, • . .
Because counsel's questioning was designed to elicit relevant
and therefore admissible testimony, it was error to exclude
it on the ground of relevancy or on any other.

5.
THE REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
SHOULD OFFSET THE NIELSONS• JUDGMENT
On May 10, 1986, the Nielsons gave notice of their
election,

pursuant

to

their

understanding

of

the

Luke

Agreement, to have Prowswood sell or purchase the property.
~On their view, Prowswood anticipatorily breached the Agreement in June of 1986.

They seek prejudgment interest from

that time.
At trial, all parties agreed that Prowswood and Luke
were entitled to offset against the judgment entered against
them the fair rental value of the property from the date of
alleged breach through trial.

The Nielsons state in their

Amended Trial Brief, "Because the Nielsons lived in the home,
Prowswood is entitled to an offset for the fair rental value
of the property together with a deed."
Trial Memorandum, p. 15.

Plaintiffs' Amended

Furthermore, the Nielsons1 counsel

stated at trial that "under the doctrine of equity [Defen20

dants] are entitled to an offset of fair rental value."
Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 83. See also. Id. at p. 7.
is a correct statement of the law.

This

See Eliason v. Watts, 615

P.2d 427 (Utah 1980).
However, the trial court failed to award an offset in
any

amount.

Even

if the balance

of the trial court's

judgment is affirmed, the case should be remanded for entry
of an offset in favor of Prowswood and Luke.
According to the expert testimony of Gene C. Jorgensen,
the fair market rental value of the property was between
$900.00 and $1,000.00 per month for each month during the
period 1986 through the date of trial.

Prowswood and Luke

are therefore entitled to an offset against the Nielsons1
judgment

of

between

$19,800

($900.00

X

22

months)

and

$22,000.00 ($1,000.00 X 22 months).

6.
IF THE NIELSONS1 JUDGMENT AGAINST PROWSWOOD IS AFFIRMED,
PROWSWOOD IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OVER AGAINST LUKE
Prowswood strenuously denies that Rita Luke had apparent
authority to bind Prowswood to the Agreement or that Prowswood

ratified

her

execution

of

the

Agreement.

But if

Prowswood is ultimately found to have granted her apparent
authority, it is entitled to indemnification from Luke for
breach of her Independent Contractor Agreement.

Prowswood
21

pled this cross-claim, briefed it, and argued it at trial,
but the trial court did not rule on it.

The Court of Appeals

should grant Prowswood"s cross-claim against Luke as a matter
of law.
As stated in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner
Insurance Agency, 96 Idaho 691, 535 P.2d 664, 670 (Idaho
1975),
It is well established in agency law that a
principal has judicial recourse against an agent
who subjects his principal to liability because of
a wrongful act beyond the agent's authority.
Accord, Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 401, Comment d.
Among the principal's remedies in this situation is an action
on the agent's contract.

Restatement

(Second) of Agency,

Sec. 399(a).
Luke lacked authority to bind Prowswood to purchase the
property.

Paragraph 9 of her Independent Contractor Agree-

ment expressly withholds the authority "to incur any expense,
enter any contract, or make any representation or commitment
for and on behalf of [Prowswood] unless such authority is
specifically given, in writing, with respect to each such
transaction."

Luke herself specifically testified that she

lacked authority to execute a purchase agreement on behalf of
Prowswood.
Indisputably, Luke breached her Independent Contractor
Agreement by executing the Agreement on Prowswoodfs behalf.
As a result of her breach, Prowswood may suffer damages in
22

the form of the judgment entered against it in this matter.
If

the

judgment

against

Prowswood

is upheld

on appeal,

Prowswood is as a matter of law entitled to contract damages
from Luke for her breach of Independent Contractor Agreement,
since Prowswood's
breach.

liability will

flow directly

from that

Prowswood's damages would consist of the amounts it

is required to pay the Nielsons plus its attorney's fees
incurred in defending against this action.
Prowswood

can discover no basis, given the lack of

knowledge, intent, a writing, or any ratifying act, for this
Court to affirm the trial court's finding of ratification.
However, Prowswood concedes that ratification would bar its
claim against Luke, since ratification releases the agent
-from

liability

to

the

principal

for

unauthorized

acts.

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 416.
A different rule governs apparent authority.

Again,

Prowswood can discover no basis, given Mr. Nielson's testimony that he relied exclusively on Luke's own representations
of authority, for this Court to affirm the trial court's
finding

of

apparent

authority.

However,

a

finding

of

apparent authority would not impair Prowswood's cross-claim
against Luke.

Unlike ratification, apparent authority is not

a defense against a principal's indemnification claim, See
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 399 et seq.

And at

least one court has specifically opined that where a princi-

pal is held liable to a third party on an apparent authority
theory,
agency

the
for

principal
exceeding

may

seek

its

actual

indemnification
authority.

from the
Stuart

v.

National Indemnity Co., 7 Ohio App.3d 63, 454 N.E.2d 158, 165
(Ct.App. Ohio 1982).

CONCLUSION
The fundamental issues on this appeal are simple.

Did

Rita Luke have authority to bind Prowswood to purchase real
property?

If not, did Prowswood

Clearly, under well
answer

to both

settled

later ratify her acts?

statutory

questions must be

and

"no."

case law, the
Therefore, the

judgment below must be reversed.
If the Court affirms the judgment below, it should at
least award Prowswood the offset all parties agree it is
entitled to, and direct that judgment be entered against Rita
Luke and in favor of Prowswood for breach of the Independent
Contractor Agreement.

_

DATED: May ]__/_, 1989
POOLE & SMITH
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann, Section 25-5-1 (1953)
Utah Code Ann, Section 25-5-3 (1953)
Utah Code Ann, Section 25-5-4 (1953)
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 27
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 98
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 399
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 401 (with comments)
Luke/Nielson Agreement
May 10, 1986 Letter from the Nielsons to Prowswood
June 10, 1986 Letter from Richard Prows to the Nielsons

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest m lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.

25-5-4.

Certain agreements void unless written a n d subscribed.

In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is m writmg subscribed by the party to
be charged therewith
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making thereot
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer m damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation.

§ 27,

Creation of Apparent Authority: General Rule

Except for the execution of instruments under seal or
for the conduct of transactions required by statute to
be authorized in a particular way, apparent authority
to do an act is created as to a third person by written
or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person
to believe that the principal consents to have the act
done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for
him.

§ 98.
Receipt of Benefits as Affirmance
The receipt by a purported principal, with knowledge of
the facts, of something to which he would not be entitled unless an act purported to be done for him were
affirmed, and to which he makes no claim except
through such act, constitutes an affirmance unless at
the time of such receipt he repudiates the act. If he
repudiates the act, his receipt of benefits constitutes an
affirmance at the election of the other party to the
transaction.

§ 399.

Remedies of Principal

A principal whose agent has violated or threatens to
violate his duties has an appropriate remedy for such
violation. Such remedy may be:
{%) an action on the contract of service;
(b) an action for losses and for the misuse of property;
(c) an action in equity to enforce the provisions of an
express trust undertaken by the agent;
(d) an action for restitution, either at law or in
equity;
(e) an action for an accounting;
(f) an action for an injunction;
(g) set-off or counterclaim;
(h) causing the agent to be made party to an action
brought by a third person against the principal;
(i) self-help;
(j) discharge; or
(k) refusal to pay compensation or rescission of the
contract of employment.

§ 401 •

Liability for Loss Caused

An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the
principal by any breach of duty.
Comment;
a. Action of tort or on the contract of employment.
The
relation between principal and agent is always consensual but not
always contractual. See § 16. A failure to perform a gratuitous
promise when there has been loss because of reliance by the principal may cause the agent to be liable only in an action 01 1011.
See § 378. On the other hand, if the sole basis for an action is a
promise by the agent to act, as when the agent agrees to represent the principal for a year and fails to do so, there being no
element of reliance by the principal, the latter has only an action
for breach of contract. But if a paid agent does something wrongful, either knowing it to be wrong, or acting negligently, the principal may have either an action of tort or an action of contract.
This is true when an agent negligently harms a chattel of the
principal, or, by negligence or fraud, causes a principal to be liable to a third person, exceeds his authority in selling goods, or
violates a duty of loyalty. This choice of remedy may be important for procedural reasons, or because of a difference between the statute of limitations for torts and for contracts.
Comment:
b. Where no damages. A failure of the agent to perform
his duties which results in no loss to the principal may subject
the agent to liability for nominal damages for breach of contract,
under the rule stated in Section 400, to liability for any profits he
has thereby made (see § 403), to discharge (see § 409), or to loss
of compensation (see § 469), but not to an action of tort.
Illustration:
1. A, the clerk of P, a contractor, being instructed to
compute the cost of erecting a building and to submit a bid
for its construction at 20 per cent, above cost, carelessly computes the cost to be $45,000, and so submits a bid for $54,000,
which is successful. A careful computation would have
shown the cost to be $50,000 which would have resulted in a
bid of $60,000 and would not have obtained the contract.
The performance of the contract does not interfere with other work by P, and his profit is $4,000. A is not liable to P in
an action of tort, but is subject to discharge.
Comment:
c. Gratuitous agents. If an agent has custody or possession of land or chattels, he is subject to the liability to which any
bailee is subject, both as to damage which he causes and for failure properly to guard them from harm. If his services are gratuitous, he is subject to the duties of care of gratuitous bailees or
those gratuitously in charge of land. See § 379 (2).
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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On the other hand, the mere failure of performance by a gratuitous agent who does not have possession or custody of something which it is his duty to protect results in liability only under
the circumstances stated in Section 378. His liability in tort is
limited to the damage caused by reliance. Thus, if the principal
had no other means of averting a loss or making a profit except
through performance by the agent, a promise by the agent followed by his nonperformance does not result in liability in tort.
If, however, the principal has relied upon the promise and, but for
such reliance, would have procured another who would have performed the service, the gratuitous promisor, as well as the paid
agent, is subject to liability in tort for the loss suffered by the
failure, including gains which the principal would have made had
the promise been performed. Compare the Restatement of Torts,
§§ 323, 324.
Illustrations:
2. P, an insurance broker, tells his friend, A, that he
would go fishing if he could find someone to attend to his
business. A volunteers to do this gratuitously and goes to
P's office. Shortly after, however, he leaves and as a result
P loses several profitable transactions. A is liable to P for
the loss.
3. Having purchased a house, P asks his friend A for
the name of a good insurance agent. A thereupon volunteers
to obtain insurance in the amount of $20,000 on the house
immediately and without charge for his services. P authorizes A to do this. A obtains a blank application but delays
in getting the insurance. A week later the house burns. P
is entitled to damages caused by A's promise and P's reliance
upon it.
4. A promises P that he will buy at auction a piece of
land for P, without charge for his services, P stating truthfully that, unless A acts for him, he will have no way of making the bid. A attends the auction but does not make the
promised bid, which would have been successful had it been
made. A is not liable to P.
Comment:
d. Subjecting 'principal to suit by third persons. Unless he
has been authorized to act in the manner in which he acts, the

agent who subjects his principal to liability because of a negligent or other wrongful act is subject to liability to the principal
for the loss which results therefrom. This includes the payment
of damages by the principal to the third person, or of a fine to the
state in case of a crime. Thus, a servant who, while acting within the scope of employment, negligently injures a third person,
although personally liable to such person, is also subject to liability to the principal if the principal is thereby required to pay
damages. See the Restatement of Restitution, § 96. If suit is
brought against a principal alone, the principal, under the provisions of some modern statutes, can cause the agent to be made
a party, or he can notify the agent to defend the suit with the
consequences stated in Comment h on Section 399.
If the principal authorizes a tort, either advertently or inadvertently, he cannot recover for harm resulting to him from it.
Hence, if the principal directs the agent to do an act which, to the
knowledge of the agent, is either tortious or criminal, the agent
is subject to no liability to the principal, unless he should realize
that the principal is mistaken and believes the act to be a lawful
one, in which case the agent would not be authorized to perform
it
Where the negligence of both principal and agent combine in
causing loss to a third person, the principal has a right to contribution in states in which this is permitted between tortfeasors.
Under some circumstances, although both are negligent, the principal may have a right to indemnity. For statements as to the
situations in which this may be true, see the Restatement of Restitution, Sections 93, 95 and 97.
e. Damage caused by disobedience. If an agent acts contrary to the principal's orders or if he fails to act as directed in
the control of the principal's things, and a loss to the principal results from such disobedience or failure to act, the agent is subject
to liability for such loss if the loss is within the risk created by
the disobedience, even though the risk of loss is less than it would
have been had the principal's directions been followed. If the disobedience consists of wrongfully dealing with chattels, the agent
may be liable for their full value, although the risk of loss was not
increased by the disobedience. See § 402.
Illustrations:
5. P directs A, his collecting agent, to extend the time
for payment by a debtor, T. A, reasonably believing that his
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References

principal's judgment is erroneous and that a present attachment on T's goods will more readily secure the collection of
the debt, levies an attachment. Because of this, T files a petition in bankruptcy, and P secures only a portion of his
claim. A is subject to liability to P upon proof that, but for
A's disobedience, a larger amount upon the claim would probably have been received.
6. P tells A to lend T S4,000, taking as security a first
mortgage on Blackacre, which is reasonably worth $10,000.
A lends T the money, taking a second mortgage as security.
Upon T's bankruptcy without assets, both mortgages are
foreclosed. Blackacre sells for its present value of $4,000, of
which $1,000 is used for payment of the first mortgage and
expenses of sale. A is subject to liability to P for $1,000.
Comment:
/. The liability of the agent is limited by the rules as to contributory negligence and avoidable consequences where those
rules are applicable. See § 415.
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1535 E a s t 6470 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 34121
llay 1 0 , 1936

Mr. S c o t t Dean
Broker
Prowswood Real cor
4385 South 900 E a s t
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 34117
Dear Mr. Dean:
We
aa
to
at

enclo8e copy of Agreement dated 11/29/35 wherein Rita Luke, acting
an agent of Prowswood Realtor, commits, under prescribed conditions,
either sell or purchase our condominium, located at above addresa,
a price that will generate net funds to us the sua of $160,000.

In keeping with the terms of the Agreement, we hereby give formal
notice that we have elected to exercise referenced option and will
look forward to receiving the proceeds of sale or purchase, totalling
$160,000, on or before September 10, 1986.
We solicit your cooperation to this end.
Sincerely,

J. Marius Nielson

Faye K# Nielson

EXHIBIT "E"
Prowswood. Ltd. • 4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City. Utah 84117 • Telephone (COD 262-4637

J u n e 10,

V

1986

J. Marius and Faye K. Nielson
1585 East 6470 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Dear Marius and Faye;
In the last several weeks, and more particularly, in the last day
or two I have been reviewing the "agreement" which you drafted on
the 29th of November, 1985 and which was signed by Rita Luke*
Also, I have reviewed carefully the subsequent communications that
have been shared between yourself and Scott Dean representing
Prowswood Realtor.
Rita and I have reviewed her understanding of this "agreement1* . I
can appreciate the consternation that has obviously resulted for
everyone in coming to a successful and satisfactory resolution.
The "agreement" makes reference to Prowswood m^ v ing a guarantee
'for "repurchase". Of course, other than the fact that Prowswood,
Ltd. was the original builder, we have never owned the property
and therefore the word "repurchase" adds to the ambiguities
therein.
Rita has been a successful real estate agent for our firm for
over 11 years. We have never had a moment's hesitation about her
representations nor uhe contract negotiations in which she has
been involved.
Additionally, because of her reputation and the
confidence we have in her, we have given her the latitude to waive
receipt of commissions both for herself and for us as a brokerage
when she feels that circumstances
justify such an action. This
current "agreement" is reflective of that type of commitment.
Our current reputation for honesty and clarity is being tested by
this situation.
Because you are valuable friends we have a
special interest in seeing that your feelings and expectations are
delicately dealt with. In light of this, we feel that it is a
reasonable compromise that Rita, as the sub-agent for me, be
permitted to immediately begin a marketing program of your
property to affect a desired sale. In keeping with our original
understanding of the "agreement", we will bear expenses relative
to marketing your home and, of course, endeavor to net you the
$160,000.00 mentioned in the November 29th "agreement"... even .f
it is necessary for us to forgo all commissions to accomplish thaend.

My involvement is tc reaffirm our united stand and our deepest
commitment to do all in our power to fulfill what we feel is our
obligation under this "agreement".
As a licensed Utah broker yourself, familiar with real estate law
and practices, and even more importantly, as one who was at one
time employed by this company, it surely must have occurred to you
that the commitment you felt Rita was making when she signed the
"agreement" you prepared^^=wa^-^far in exCess of the authority
granted to her as an, independent agent in behalf of the Company.
I hope this matter can be ""resolved to a mutually satisfying
conclusion. My best to your wife.
Warm personal regards,

(/^ Lfc < <
Richard S.Prows, Chairman
Prowswood, Ltd.
cc: Rita Luke
Scott Dean
Reed Harding

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that the / /

day of May, 1989, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Prowswood,
Ltd. , was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following counsel
and parties of record:
David R. Olsen, Esq,
Gary R. Henrie, Esq.
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson
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700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
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